On moral hazard and nonexclusive contracts

We study an economy where intermediaries compete over contracts in a nonexclusive insurance market affected by moral hazard. Our setting is the same as that developed in Bisin and Guaitoli [2004]. The present note provides a counterexample to the set of necessary conditions for high effort equilibria developed in Bisin and Guaitoli [2004] and suggests an alternative equilibrium characterization.non-exclusivity ; insurance ; moral hazard

Multiple Lending and Constrained Efficiency in the Credit Market

In this paper we present a model of credit market with several homogeneous lenders competing to finance an investment project. Contracts are non-exclusive, hence the borrower can accept whatever subset of the offered loans. We use the model to discuss efficiency issues in competitive economies with asymmetric information and non-exclusive agreements. We characterize the equilibria of this common agency game with moral hazard and show that they all belong to the constrained Pareto frontierCommon Agency; Moral Hazard; Parto Efficiency; Second Best

Multiple Lending and Constrained Efficiency in the Credit Market

This paper studies the relationship between competition and incentives in an economy with financial contracts. We concentrate on non-exclusive credit relationships, those where an entrepreneur can simultaneously accept more than one contractual offer. Several homogeneous lenders compete on the contracts they offer to finance the entrepreneur's investment project. We model a common agency game with moral hazard, and we characterize its equilibria. As expected, notwithstanding the competition among the principals (lenders), non-competitive outcomes can be supported. In particular, positive profit equilibria are pervasive. We then provide a complete welfare analysis and show that all equilibrium allocations turn out to be constrained Pareto efficient.Common Agency, Financial Markets, Efficiency

Non-Exclusive Competition in the Market for Lemons

We consider an exchange economy in which a seller can trade an endowment of a divisible good whose quality she privately knows. Buyers compete in menus of non-exclusive contracts, so that the seller may choose to trade with several buyers. In this context, we show that an equilibrium always exists and that aggregate equilibrium allocations are generically unique. Although the good offered by the seller is divisible, aggregate equilibrium allocations exhibit no fractional trades. In equilibrium, goods of relatively low quality are traded at the same price, while goods of higher quality may end up not being traded at all if the adverse selection problem is severe. This provides a novel strategic foundation for Akerlof's (1970) results, which contrasts with standard competitive screening models postulating enforceability of exclusive contracts. Latent contracts that are issued but not traded in equilibrium turn out to be an essential feature of our construction.